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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PROJECTING CIVIL LITIGATION THROUGH THE LENS OF FILM
THEORY

MELISSA COLE*

I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the movie Shadow of the Vampire,1 John Malkovich’s powerhungry director goes into a frenzy of filmmaking ecstasy when the eccentric
star of his film Nosferatu decides that he has waited long enough for the
promised opportunity to drink his co-star’s blood and kills the actors and
crewmembers who try to stop him. When his cameraman moves to help the
victims, Malkovich admonishes him to continue filming the gruesome
sequence of events. “If it isn’t in the frame,” Malkovich rants, “it doesn’t
exist.”2
As soon as I heard those lines, it occurred to me that the film was about
Civil Procedure. What is procedure, after all, but the method by which
information makes it into the frame of the trial? And what is the jury but the
audience for the story?3
Certainly, the parallels between a film audience and a trial jury have been
recognized before.4 That observation, however, seems to be only the first step
in a more searching analysis. If juries put together the evidence to form a legal
narrative in the same manner that movie audiences put together the bits of
visual information presented to them to form a filmic narrative, then lawyers
play the role of the filmmaker. They choose what information is presented to
their audience, how it is presented, and what conclusion the decision-maker is
meant to draw from it.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. My thanks to Arthur Knight
for introducing me to film theory and for making space for my legal background in my study of
it. Special thanks to the staff of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for giving me the
opportunity to combine my interests in film theory and civil procedure, and, of course, to my
research assistant, Jennifer Heintz, who filled in the spaces between my frames.
1. SHADOW OF THE VAMPIRE (Universal Studios 2000).
2. Id.
3. See MICHAEL E. TIGAR, EXAMINING WITNESSES 5 (1993) (“People, including judges
and jurors, understand and restate events in terms of stories.”).
4. See, e.g., Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in
a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 40 (1994).
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By extension, if lawyers are really filmmakers, then a course in Civil
Procedure teaches them the mechanics of filmmaking. No director can survive
without some knowledge of camera operation, lighting, editing, and acting.
Likewise, the only way a civil litigator can hope to present her story in court is
through a solid understanding of the tools available to help her tell her story.
And just as most moviegoers remain oblivious to all the painstaking tasks that
go into making a film, so it is equally tempting to think that a trial is all there is
to civil litigation. However, a good film student knows how crucial the unseen
elements—the lighting, the location, and the script re-writes—are to a
successful film. One would hope that law students, presumably interested in
legal narratives, would find strategic considerations like choice of jurisdiction,
pleading, and discovery equally important.
Admittedly, few law students find a course in Civil Procedure as
stimulating as a good film. Applying film theory to the course concepts might
help to alleviate this understandable lack of interest in the “how-to’s” of a
practice most Civil Procedure students will not see for three years. More
importantly, film theory brings a critical perspective to our civil litigation
system and exposes the issues of power and powerlessness we are more
accustomed to confronting in substantive courses.5 Failing to appreciate the
power dynamics of procedure consigns even the most conscientious student,
practitioner, or professor to replicate and perpetuate them.
In this essay, I survey the four basic units of a Civil Procedure course:
jurisdiction, pleadings, discovery, and resolution. For each, I introduce an
applicable tenet of film theory and apply it to a case or rule covered in most
Civil Procedure courses. My goal is not merely to investigate how civil
litigation frames real-life events and the consequences of that system, but also,
hopefully, to convince others that these issues merit time in the classroom.
While we may not have an obligation to entertain students in the way
successful movies entertain their audiences, our job is certainly to educate
them, not only on the mechanics of legal practices, but also on the power they
employ as attorneys and on the responsibilities that accrue to such power.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, OR WHY THE AUDIENCE MATTERS
In the film Fury,6 Spencer Tracy enjoys the unique experience of watching
the trial of the mob accused of killing him. A happy-go-lucky regular Joe (his
name in the film) when the story begins, he becomes an embittered phantom
after barely escaping a lynch mob in the small town where he had been jailed

5. Examining the specific substantive disputes between parties makes it easier to focus, for
example, on which party had greater bargaining power because of her class, race, and/or sex, or
how tort law favors parties with the financial means to account for their negligent actions in their
yearly budgets.
6. FURY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1936).
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because he fit the description of another stranger who had molested several
children. Listening to the trial intently on the radio, Joe is horrified to discover
that the witnesses—members of the same small community as the accused—do
their best to protect their friends and that the jury seems disinclined to convict.
In the end, Joe, the outsider, must appear in court to tell the truth, in the
process, of course, absolving the defendants of murder charges.
Joe’s downfall lies in the fact that he is an outsider in a small town, where
the townspeople are bound to stick together. Although the audience can
clearly see that Joe is the furthest thing from a child molester, the people of the
jurisdiction in which he was arrested and lynched are not privy to the first half
hour of the film, in which the audience learns what a good guy Joe is. The
jurisdiction is far from Joe’s home. It is a small town, committed to its own,
with a less-than-sophisticated criminal and court system. In a big city, Joe
would likely not have been jailed or lynched; in a different jurisdiction, the
outcome of his attempted-killers’ trial might have come to a different
conclusion.
Jurisdiction, in other words, matters. Lawyers know this; anyone who
practices regularly in federal courts is likely to have written her fair share of
jurisdictional motions. First-year law students, however, quite understandably,
have trouble appreciating its importance. Without exposure to the variety of
state laws, the differences in court systems, and the hard realities of longdistance litigation, jurisdiction reduces for law students to a not-veryinteresting intellectual exercise in which the Supreme Court seems to take an
inordinate and unjustified interest.
Yet all of us can recall some film that we disliked because of our viewing
experience—the bad date we saw it with, the movie theater whose air
conditioner collapsed in the middle of the film, the epic that we rented and
watched on video while paying the bills. Similarly, movie studios spend
countless dollars determining which demographic group is most likely to see
the movie and marketing it directly to them. Audiences determine whether a
film breaks the bank or breaks the back of the distributor.
So, too, the jurisdiction in which a case is heard is probably the single
greatest determinant of which party will succeed. As Janet Staiger has
observed, “without an audience, some would argue, no text or maker of [the]
text exists.”7 By the same token, without a jurisdiction with authority to hear a
case, the legal narrative—the means by which a dispute between two people
acquires legal meaning and the power of redress—ceases to exist as well.

7. JANET STAIGER, INTERPRETING FILMS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORICAL RECEPTION OF
AMERICAN CINEMA 3 (1992).
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The Film Theory: Reception Studies

Reception studies “defin[es] the reader as the source of meaning [in a
film].”8 In other words, it posits that a particular film is not inscribed with a
particular meaning, but rather that it acquires meaning through the audience
members who interpret it. Reception studies’ objective lies “not [in]
attempt[ing] to construct a generalized, systematic explanation of how
individuals might have comprehended texts, and possibly someday will, but
rather how they actually have understood them.”9 Film theorists recognize it
as a political tool for examining how different groups of people, particularly
traditionally ignored or subordinated people, construct meanings from a text
that might be very different from the meaning the filmmakers hoped to
inscribe.10
Reception studies provides a useful framework for helping first-year law
students understand the importance of jurisdiction because most of them can
see how the perspective of different viewers influences how those individuals
receive a film.11 In the same way that a film theorist might ask, “[w]hat is the
spectator’s relation to the cinematic text?,”12 law students can ask about the
relationship between the case itself and the audience that hears it—the jury, the
judge, and the lawyers arguing the case. Their personal circumstances and
biases can plainly color their perception of justice in the same way the
students’ own perceptions differ from each other.
Perhaps, more importantly, reception studies also helps to highlight how
the jurisdictional law that applies to a case can radically change the story that
eventually makes its way into the courtroom. Just as a film spectator “is
constituted within a social formation,”13 so the “society” of a particular
jurisdictional law influences how the case’s spectators will perceive it. Staiger
explains that the meaning viewers inscribe onto a film “may reside in whether
or not spectators use referential codes to presume correspondence between the
moving images and the real world.”14 In other words, how viewers make sense
of the story—whether they find it believable—depends largely on their own
frame of reference. The law of the jurisdiction provides the frame of reference
in which the lawyers and decision-makers make sense of the events giving rise
to the lawsuit.

8. Marc Silberman, Robert C. Holub’s Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction, 33 NEW
GERMAN CRITIQUE 249, 250 (1984) (book review).
9. STAIGER, supra note 7, at 8.
10. Id. at 96.
11. See id. (“[I]nterpreting a film requires perceiving from some perspective . . . .”).
12. Id. at 95.
13. Id. at 96.
14. STAIGER, supra note 7, at 96.
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Robert Darnton illustrated this process in the filmic context in his review
of Danton, a Polish movie about the French Revolution.15 Darnton explained
that the film served an allegorical function for Polish audiences. Because
Polish audiences had a tradition of “liv[ing] with veiled meanings and
ambiguous protests,” they saw the film not so much as about the French
Revolution, but as an allegory about Stalin and his thought-control tactics.16 In
this context, Robespierre was the personification of an evil that transcended his
role in the film. French audiences, on the other hand, saw Robespierre, while a
despicable historical figure in reality, as the character in the film who set the
Revolution in motion, and, therefore, as representing republican values of
which the French were proud.17 If the filmic Robespierre were on trial for his
acts, his attorneys would, no doubt, argue strenuously that jurisdiction should
lie in France rather than Poland.
Once jurisdiction becomes about how different audiences can change the
meaning of the lawsuit, the doors are open to consider the attendant inherent
social biases in the law. Recognizing the range of possible interpretations of
events arouses curiosity about the sorts of sociological factors that might
influence such interpretations.18 Staiger explains that differences in the
received meanings of films “are not idiosyncratic but due to social, political,
and economic conditions, as well as to constituted identities such as gender,
sexual preference, race, ethnicity, class, and nationality.”19 A discussion of
why the parties preferred one jurisdiction over another would be incomplete
without considerations of who the decision-makers are likely to be.
So, too, anyone teaching Civil Procedure would do well to recognize that
the students themselves are audience members—not just of the course, but of
the case being discussed. At a fundamental level, they should be encouraged
to be an audience to the legal story that takes over from the events underlying
the case. As audience members, students also bring their own backgrounds
and perceptions to the discussion. To dismiss one student’s perception of what
the case means as off the mark may say more about the professor who can not
see beyond her own frame of reference than about the student’s understanding
of effective procedural lawyering.

15. Robert Darnton, Danton and Double-Entendre, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 16, 1984, at 19.
16. Id. at 20.
17. See id.
18. See STAIGER, supra note 7, at 80-81 (describing her goals as “requir[ing], minimally,
tracing as far as possible dominant and marginalized historical interpretive strategies as mediated
by language and context”).
19. Id. at xi.
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Civil Procedure: Considering the Audience

In Civil Procedure, of course, practice is more important than theory.
Applying reception theory to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson20
illustrates how it can influence students’ own reception to personal jurisdiction
and open discussion to the important role of procedure in seeking social
justice.
Any Civil Procedure professor is all too familiar with the facts of WorldWide Volkswagen. In 1977, Kay Eloise Robinson and her two children were
seriously injured when the car she was driving was struck from behind and the
gasoline tank ruptured, causing a fire in the passenger compartment.21 The
Robinsons brought suit in Oklahoma state court against the manufacturer of the
car, the U.S. importer, the distributor, and the retail dealer.22 The distributor
and the dealer, both located in New York, challenged the jurisdiction of the
Oklahoma court, arguing that neither one “[did] any business in Oklahoma,
ship[ped] or [sold] any products to or in that State, ha[d] an agent to receive
process there, or purchase[d] advertisements in any media calculated to reach
Oklahoma.”23
The World-Wide Volkswagen majority opined that, while it might be
foreseeable that a car purchased in New York would be involved in an accident
in Oklahoma, “the foreseeability that is critical to due process is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is
that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”24 Due to the lack
of evidence “that any automobiles distributed by World-Wide [were] sold to
retail customers outside [the] tristate area,” the majority found the Oklahoma
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants unconstitutional.25
The first and most obvious application of reception theory would prompt
considerations of why the Robinsons fought so vigorously to have their case
heard in Oklahoma in the first place. Beyond issues about the convenience of
the parties, students surely would have views on how decision-makers might
differ in New York and Oklahoma. Such discussions in the first months of law
school seem particularly important in a course designed to introduce concepts
of federalism.26
20. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
21. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 353 (Okla. 1978), rev’d,
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. Id.
23. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 289.
24. Id. at 297.
25. Id. at 298.
26. This observation holds true even as the Internet jurisdiction cases shake the very
foundations of that concept. See, e.g., Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F.
Supp. 2d 907, 908-09 (D. Or. 1999).
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Not only would an Oklahoma audience for the case probably differ from a
New York audience,27 but the context in which the case must be interpreted is
fundamental to the Supreme Court’s articulation of personal jurisdiction as a
concern of constitutional due process. Reading the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s decision28 introduces students to the difference between the
prerequisite of ensuring that the state long-arm statute applies29 and the
subsequent question whether this application violates the due process rights of
the defendant.30 In essence, the U.S. Supreme Court is the audience for the
Oklahoma court’s construction of the Oklahoma long-arm statute. The U.S.
Supreme Court constructs the rules by which federal courts interpret the
application of such state statutes.
With the help of reception studies, jurisdiction might lose some of its
thankless status as the one thing everyone remembers hating in their first year
of law school and no one remembers understanding. Students may gain some
perspective on jurisdiction by conceptualizing the cases they read as nothing
more than stories told in an unfamiliar setting and the members of the legal
community involved in the telling simply as the audience. So, too, they gain
the added benefit of tackling that most difficult of first-year difficulties—
believing that there is no “right” answer and that all of them have valuable
interpretations to bring to the table, as long as they observe the necessary
conditions for constructing legal meaning.
III. PLEADINGS AND NARRATIVE FRAMES
In Rear Window,31 the literal limits of the frames that make up a film
create some of the best of Alfred Hitchcock’s signature suspense films.
Confined to a wheelchair with a broken leg, Jimmy Stewart’s photojournalist
“Jeff” Jeffries amuses himself by watching the dramas that unfold in the
windows of the apartments he sees from his own. Viewing small pieces of his
neighbors’ lives as they walk in and out of the frame of their windows, Jeffries
constructs stories about each of them—Miss Lonelyhearts waiting for the date
who never arrives; Miss Torso dancing erotically for unknown men; and, of
course, the sudden disappearance of Mrs. Thorwald and Jeffries’ conclusion
that she was murdered by her husband.
When Jeffries suggests his murder theory to a detective, the detective
protests, “That’s a secret, private world you’re looking into out there. People
27. Disagreement with this principle would, of course, probably lead to fruitful and engaging
classroom discussion.
28. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978). The casebook
I use, BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2001), helpfully includes the opinion.
29. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 585 P.2d at 353.
30. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291.
31. REAR WINDOW (Paramount Studios 1954).
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do a lot of things in private that they couldn’t possibly explain in public.”32
The wisdom of this remark applies equally to the pleadings in a civil lawsuit.
Certain facts, perhaps taken out of context, can create a very different story
from the full picture. No doubt the views from the front windows of the
apartments Jeffries watches would yield different scenes and, thus, different
stories about the apartments’ inhabitants. It is all a matter of which window
the spectator looks into, of how the story is framed for her.
So, too, pleadings can be understood as the frames that must contain the
messy, real-life events that give rise to a legal dispute; a means of choosing
certain facts to construct a story. The law contributes to this structure by
making available certain causes of action requiring the satisfaction of certain
elements. The real strategy, then, lies with the parties as they struggle to gain
the dominant voice in constructing the legal framework that will guide
discovery and the story that they ultimately present to the decision-maker.
A.

The Film Theory: Feminist Film Theory

In 1975, Laura Mulvey’s influential essay, Visual Pleasure and Narrative
Cinema,33 radically altered—and, arguably, created—feminist film theory. In
the piece, Mulvey posits the woman in filmic narrative as the object of the
cinematic gaze. She explains how the female character is the medium upon
which both the male protagonist and the viewer gaze, the conduit for the
information the hero and the audience need to construct a coherent narrative.34
As the object, rather than the subject, the woman has no volition of her own,
and, instead, serves as the means of signifying what the story is about, rather
than contributing to the story by her own actions.35
This theory is particularly significant for film viewers, who are not aware
that they are gazing at the woman and identifying with the man, thus
replicating the conditions of power inscribed into the filmic narrative. As
Teresa de Lauretis explains, “the spectators are not aware of their own look, of
themselves as looking on, as being voyeuristically complicit in the pleasures
built into the image.”36 Not only do the viewers remain unaware of their own
complicity in constructing the story, but “they are not aware of the look of the
camera, so that they have the impression that the events, people, and places
figured on the screen exist somewhere, in an objective—if fictional—world
created by the filmmaker, the director, the artist.”37

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, 16 SCREEN 6 (1975).
Id. at 13.
Id.
TERESA DE LAURETIS, TECHNOLOGIES OF GENDER: ESSAYS OF THEORY, FILM, AND
FICTION 98 (1987).
37. Id.
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The parallel to a lawsuit’s audience is apparent. The decision-makers, the
lawyers, and probably even the parties themselves must view events as they are
framed by the pleadings. Common sense dictates that people’s actions are not
designed to conform neatly to legal dictates. If they were, there would be no
need for the vats of ink that fill the pages of casebooks, treatises, and reporters,
in which judges pontificate about whether a defendant owed a duty of care to
the plaintiff or whether the parties actually agreed to the bargain. Yet, in the
framework of the complaint, actions must satisfy the elements of the claim.
Any actions beyond the chosen frame of the legal elements become irrelevant.
The pleadings are, in effect, the shooting script for the movie, the preparation
for what will appear onscreen before the decision-maker/audience.
What makes the pleadings so effective is the fact that the audience tends
not to notice how the legal framework reshapes events in its image. As de
Lauretis explains, “the cinema screen acts like a dream screen for the
spectator-subject, a screen at once bearing and hiding, displaying and
displacing, unconscious images and ‘thoughts.’”38 In other words, as much
unconscious thought goes into the decision-makers’ construction of the story
as conscious thought. Without seeing the constraints placed on the story—the
blank spaces that fail to fit the pieces of the legal puzzle—the decision-makers
arrive at an uncritical conclusion about what actually happened when, in fact,
the story is likely far more complicated. What really happened disappears
outside the frame, but they never miss it because they are not aware that a
frame exists.
What the legal decision-makers arrive at is, like the story constructed by a
filmgoer, “an integral realism, a recreation of the world in [their] own image,
an image unburdened by the freedom of interpretation of the artist or the
irreversibility of time.”39 The import of this conclusion gains resonance when
viewed in light of a preceding examination of jurisdiction. As discussed,40
different decision-makers bring very different backgrounds and expectations to
their construction of what happened between the parties. In other words,
ignorant of their position as spectators presented events within a limiting
framework, they construct a version of reality that is imbued with their own
sense of reality and that reinscribes the relationship of powerful subject to
powerless object.

38. Id. at 97.
39. ANDRÉ BAZIN, The Myth of Total Cinema, in WHAT IS CINEMA? 21 (Hugh Gray trans.,
1967).
40. See supra Part II.
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Civil Procedure: Framing the Gaze

Feminist film theory illustrates how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Conley v. Gibson41 does far more than simply provide the controlling
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that the complaint contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim . . . .”42 The decision also exposes the practice
and pitfalls of framing the narrative in the pleadings and the play of powers
that determine meaning in a lawsuit.
In Conley, the plaintiffs, African-American employees of the Texas and
New Orleans Railroad, brought suit on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated black employees after the Railroad discharged or demoted
them in 1954 claiming that it was abolishing their positions, when in fact it
filled the positions with white employees.43 The plaintiffs had no cause of
action against their employer,44 so they sued the union to which they belonged
pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).45 Because the collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and the Railroad provided covered
employees with protection from discharge and demotion, the plaintiffs argued
that the Union violated the RLA because it “did nothing to protect them against
these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection
comparable to that given white employees.”46
The Union moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.47 According to the Union, the RLA imposed on
it only a duty to represent union members fairly in the negotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement, which it did, as evidenced by the provisions
on discharge and demotion.48 The Union argued that it could not be held
responsible for the subsequent discriminatory conduct of the Railroad alleged
in the plaintiffs’ complaint.49
Two important points flow from an examination of the complaint within
the tenets of feminist film theory. First of all, the dominant conventions of the
storytelling medium—be it narrative cinema or the legal system—dictate how
a story must be told in order for its audience to find it coherent. A legal story
must be framed within the dictates of some substantive law. A lengthy and
confusing piece of writing, the complaint did not set forth a coherent legal
41. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 42 (1957).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
43. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.
44. Title VII, which provides a private cause of action for race discrimination by businesses
with at least 15 employees, was not enacted until 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
45. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Union also moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds and for the failure to join
an indispensable party as a defendant. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 47.
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story. Therefore, although it presented the events as the plaintiffs understood
them, it did not make sense to the trial judge, who expected a legal narrative.
The second point follows on this observation, although it is often ignored:
the dominant discourse is not the only one. Discussing why the plaintiffs
framed the complaint as they did gives rise to a consideration of how the
narrative conventions of pleading exert tremendous power over the parties’
ability to receive legal recompense for their injuries. In Conley, the plaintiffs,
as African-American men working in Texas in the 1950s, were obviously
disempowered. They had an important story to tell, yet they could not tell it in
court. It, therefore, becomes relatively easy for law students to see the patterns
of power and inequity embedded in the seemingly simple process of civil
pleading.
Discussing the legal constraints the Conley plaintiffs faced lends yet
another layer of complexity to the framing process. Quite apparently, the
employer, the Railroad, engaged in blatant racial discrimination. Yet, at the
time they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs had no federal cause of action
against their employer.50 In order to avoid a hostile Texas state court, they
strained to fit events into the framework of the Railway Labor Act.51 Under
the RLA, however, the plaintiffs had to seek redress from their union
representatives, not their employer who had harmed them.52
The law thus framed the complaint in a way that radically changed the
plaintiff’s story. They were forced to cast the Union as the sole perpetrator of
discrimination. The Railroad’s discriminatory acts, placed outside the narrative
framework by the applicable law, was so diminished as to make both the
district court judge and the appellate panel determine that they lacked
jurisdiction to hear the dispute.53
The plaintiffs were, thus, quite apparently powerless within the dominant
legal discourse that determined how they could frame their story. They were
positioned much as feminist film theory posits women are positioned within a
filmic narrative, as objects that are acted upon rather than subjects that can act
of their own accord. They faced the problem of “speak[ing] as subjects of
discourses which negate or objectify [them] through their representations.”54
One might argue that all of this theory is negated by the fact that the
Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and found that, as
50. See supra note 44.
51. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 42.
52. Id. at 46.
53. Id. at 43-44. The lower courts concluded that the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(NRAB) had exclusive jurisdiction because the dispute was over the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. The Court reversed, stating that the Railway Labor Act conferred
exclusive jurisdiction in the NRAB only for disputes between employees and their employers, not
for claims of unfair discrimination by the union. Id. at 44-45.
54. DE LAURETIS, supra note 36, at 127.
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much as the complaint deviated from legal narrative conventions, it did, in fact,
state a claim sufficient to withstand the defendants’ motion to dismiss.55
Indeed, raising the question of why the Court worked so hard to find a valid
claim inevitably leads to fruitful classroom discussion about the circumstances
justifying the Court’s decision in Conley and its ramifications as a rule of law
for subsequent cases. Students can surely see that the Court’s interpretation of
Rule 8(a)(2) was not objectively divorced from the circumstances of the case
before it, which few people would dispute militated in favor of allowing the
claim to proceed in federal court.
The protective stance of the Court, however, leads back to the issues of
power and powerlessness exemplified by the lower courts. The Supreme
Court, from its position of authority, essentially rewrote the complaint in the
terms of the legal discourse it dominated. The Court constructed a story
different from the one the plaintiffs told. Certainly, such a retelling was
necessary if the plaintiffs were to have any hope of legal redress. But just as a
female moviegoer must gaze at and therefore objectify the female character in
the film,56 so the Conley plaintiffs had no choice but to participate in their own
powerlessness within the legal system.
Feminist film theory thus can do for Civil Procedure what it has done for
narrative cinema. It can wake us up to the fact that we are observing a
constructed narrative, not a depiction of real life. It can remind us of our own
role in constructing the story we see. And, most importantly, once we have
been exposed to it, it refuses to let us ignore the power of the subject and the
powerlessness of the object within the telling of any legal story. As
responsible lawyers, we must, at least, admit to this dynamic. As responsible
law professors, we should, at least, give the students the same option.
IV. DISCOVERY AND THE “SOCIAL IMAGINARY”
The infamous Rodney King video exposed people who had never seen a
police baton removed from an officer’s belt to the reality of physical force. It
reopened and reworked discussions about racism in the United States. It
sparked riots across the city of Los Angeles, with grave damage to property,
individuals, and communities. But it did not, at their first trial, convict the
police officers who were captured beating Rodney King on videotape.
The shock at the first verdict finding the police officers innocent57—even
when the video footage had been replayed so many times on television—
reverberated into riots. It found less violent expression in the belief that the

55. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45.
56. See DE LAURETIS, supra note 36, at 127.
57. Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1991, at A1.
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jury was racist.58 What other explanation could there be for a failure to convict
in the face of such indisputable videotaped evidence of excessive force?
Considering the videotape and the trial outcome in the context of civil
discovery might provide some answers to this question. For the purposes of
understanding Civil Procedure as the construction of a legal narrative, film
theory explains the ways in which viewers may interpret the information the
filmmakers present and, therefore, how the parties to a lawsuit seek to use the
information they receive in discovery to construct a narrative that fits their
framing of the story. Discovery thus becomes a crucial part of the filmmaking
process of civil litigation, for the legal stories can be told only through the
documentary footage at the parties’ disposal.
A.

The Film Theory: The “Blurred Boundaries”59 of Documentary Film

Documentary film theory seems a particularly useful framework for
considering civil discovery because, as Bill Nichols observes, documentary
films “appear as pale reflections of the dominant, instrumental discourses in
our society.”60 While they purport to record “reality”—just as discovery is
designed to find out what “really” happened61—documentary films, “[l]ike
fiction, . . . can . . . suggest that [their] perceptions and values belong to [their]
characters, or adhere to the historical world itself: the film merely reveals what
we could have seen around us had we, too, looked with a patient, discerning
eye.”62 In suggesting to the viewer that what she is seeing is “true” and
unbiased, documentary film has the power to engage in “the discursive
formations, the language games, and rhetorical stratagems by and through
which pleasure and power, ideologies and utopias, subjects and subjectivities
receive tangible representation.”63 This power brings with it the decline of
“[t]he goal of documenting reality . . . .”64
The ability of the defense to obtain an acquittal in spite of the Rodney
King video illustrates this process of documentary distortion, received by its
audience as documented reality. In his essay The Trials and Tribulations of
Rodney King, Nichols calls the prosecution’s belief that the videotape was the

58. See BILL NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES: QUESTIONS OF MEANING IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 21 (1994) [hereinafter NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES].
59. See id.
60. BILL NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY: ISSUES AND CONCEPTS IN DOCUMENTARY 6
(1991) [hereinafter NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY].
61. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
62. NICHOLS, REPRESENTING REALITY, supra note 60, at 6.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id.
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“proverbial smoking gun” a “positivist fallacy.”65 While the prosecution
viewed the tape as a document of one particular reality, the defense reworked
the “reality” it documented, turning it into “[c]onfirmation . . . . [o]f the rough
and brutal nature of police work. . . . the risk and uncertainty that confront
officers in the street. . . . [and] the dire necessity of controlled force to
safeguard the men in blue and preserve the lives of suspects who might
otherwise be killed.”66
The defense in effect changed the meaning of the videotape—and, in the
process, showed that no piece of evidence is imbued with absolute meaning—
by constructing a story outside the frame of the video, a story of “[i]mportant,
mitigating events [that] occurred before the tape began.”67 In this story, King’s
own behavior justified the officers’ brutal actions. According to the defense,
the officers had reason to believe he was a dangerous felon, so that the frame
of the video “treats all King’s subsequent behavior as confirmation: King was
a serious threat who ‘knew all the tricks to take out a police officer.’”68 Hence,
“[j]ustification and motivation for what follows resides in this prior set of
events for which no video record exists.”69
What made the defense’s use of the documentary video so brilliant,
Nichols concludes, was that their reinterpretation depended on “the degree to
which [their] claims correspond[ed] to the social imaginary within which the
listener, or jury, already lives.”70 In other words, the defense simply tapped
into the jury’s “social imaginary”—“those social relations members of [the
jury] imagine they have to their actual relation to another group”71—and
recognized how the jury would be inclined to read the videotape as
confirmation of their own preexisting prejudices and fears.
The lessons for civil discovery are apparent. First of all, there is no
absolute and unified story to be found in discovery. Treating each piece of
information as indicative of the truth of one’s story disadvantages the attorney
through her own ignorance. Rarely does the information obtained through
discovery appear to be the “smoking gun” that the King video seemed to the
prosecution; yet even this supposedly indisputable evidence of police brutality

65. NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES, supra note 58, at 22; see also DE LAURETIS, supra
note 36, at 133 (“The space constructed by the film is not only a textual or filmic space of vision,
in frame and off—for an off-screen space is still inscribed in the images . . . .”).
66. NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES, supra note 58, at 22-23.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. (quoting STACEY KOON & ROBERT DEITZ, PRESUMED GUILTY: THE TRAGEDY OF
THE RODNEY KING AFFAIR 32 (1992)); see also id. at 29 (describing the defense’s presentation of
the tape as confirmation of “‘buffed out’ black males, urban danger, and the police as the thin
blue line between chaos and civilization”).
69. Id. at 24.
70. Id. at 30.
71. NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES, supra note 58, at 30.
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and racism was capable of more than one interpretation. Far from uncovering
the truth about the events giving rise to the lawsuit,72 discovery, at best,
provides the parties with scenes to play before the jury in a certain sequence
that constructs the story they want to tell.73
In the discovery phase, civil attorneys finally emerge clearly as
filmmakers. While the role may have been subtle as they chose their
jurisdictional audience and framed the dispute in the pleadings, the filmmaking
aspects of these roles become apparent as, like documentary filmmakers, they
gather the facts that they will construct into their own version of “reality.”
B.

Civil Procedure: Gathering the Footage

The dangers and possibilities of civil discovery as documentary
filmmaking can be illustrated by considering the recent change in Rule
26(b)(1).74 In 2000, the Rule was revised in an attempt to cabin the extremely
broad scope of discovery. Under the prior version of the Rule, parties were
free to discover any information “relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action,” while the 2000 amendment restricts discovery to information that is
“relevant to claims and defenses of any party.”75
Under the old “relevant to the subject matter” Rule, what was “relevant”
was framed entirely by the “social imaginary” of the viewers—the parties and
their representatives engaged in the discovery process. Because the scope of
discovery under the old Rule was extremely expansive,76 the parties were free
to inscribe their own story onto events by searching broadly for any events that
confirmed their conceptualization of the dispute. As Nichols explains,
“meaning is what we, audience or jury, attach to a signifier, to render it
intelligible.”77 In other words, events have no inherent meaning other than
what individuals assign to them.
Viewed in the context of documentary film theory, the new “relevant to the
claim or defense of any party” Rule is a distinction without a difference. The
language of the revised Rule specifically links discoverable information to the
parties’ framing of the story, their claims or defenses. Yet, as discussed
previously, parties develop their claims or defenses in order to frame a story

72. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (characterizing liberal discovery as
designed to ensure “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties”).
73. See André Bazin, The Evolution of the Language of Cinema, in FILM THEORY AND
CRITICISM: INTRODUCTORY READINGS 89 (Gerald Mast & Marshall Cohen eds. 1974)
(describing how “the mind of the spectator . . . accept[s] the viewpoints of the director which are
justified by the geography of the action or the shifting emphasis of dramatic interest”).
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note.
76. See, e.g., Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 16 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 87 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
77. NICHOLS, BLURRED BOUNDARIES, supra note 58, at 29.
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that corresponds to their version of events, not to tell the whole “truth” about
what happened.78 Just as the defense in the Rodney King case used the video
to confirm their version of events, so the parties in civil discovery are directed
to seek information that verifies their own “social imaginary,” or at least what
they hope will be the “social imaginary” of the decision-maker.79 “Relevance”
under the new version of the Rule is thus even more closely aligned with the
power of the parties’ narratives.
Another layer of strategy also goes into the construction of documentary
film, one that further belies the truth-seeking function of liberal discovery.80
Just as the documentary filmmaker must construct a narrative out of whatever
footage she is able to capture, so the civil attorney’s narrative is limited by the
information she is able to obtain in discovery. Any information that is not
discovered ceases to exist for the purposes of the legal narrative. Information,
in turn, will not be discovered unless the lawyers specifically ask for it.81
What the lawyers seek to discover, however, depends on what they believe
is relevant—how they create the story. Because lawyers create the story for a
particular audience, their goal is not to tell an empirically true story, but the
version of it that will convince the decision-maker to rule in their favor.
Limiting discovery to information relevant to the stories constructed by each
party thus clarifies that discovery is not about uncovering the true version of
events, but about constructing the narratives of the parties, imbued as they are
with expectations about the “social imaginary” of the decision-maker.82
Using documentary film theory to deconstruct the tenets of liberal
discovery certainly provides fodder for classroom discussion. Some people
would surely see nothing wrong with the proposition that the parties construct
their own stories in a way designed to ensure that the decision-maker believes
they are true; such, one might argue, is the nature of an adversarial system.
Others might decry the entire deconstructionist project as nothing but
skepticism, a theory that distorts the empirical nature of certain facts and the
ability of the decision-maker to arrive at a correct version of reality. Both
78. See supra Part III.
79. See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 40 (“People prefer stories neat. Recognizable characters,
familiar motives, and recurring scenarios of conflict and resolution are typical elements of our
workaday narrative world. Legal narratives are no different.”).
80. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
81. But see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring parties to disclose certain information without
a request such as the names, addresses and phone numbers of people likely to have discoverable
information, a description or copy of all tangible items that will be used at trial, a computation of
damages, and a copy of a relevant insurance policy).
82. See Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 273, 277 (1989) (“In an actual case there will be many potential frames of reference which
could be recalled by jurors from their schematic databases and contribute to assessments of
similarity. However, . . . cognitive biases and limitations cause jurors to filter out many of these
potential frames of reference.”).
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positions bring up ethical issues about how much to disclose and how to
disclose it, as well as the limits of legal strategizing. And, as with all film
theory, such discussion exposes students to the great power of legal storytellers
and of their responsibility to resist the temptations of using the stereotypes and
inherent biases of the “social imaginary” to fill in the gaps in their own cases.
V. TRIALS, VERDICTS, AND POSTMODERN THEORY
The documentary film The Thin Blue Line is probably best known for
leading to the release of Randall Dale Adams from death row.83 The film’s
success showed how it had the power to reinforce its own message—that the
legal process, like a documentary film, is not designed to uncover empirical
truths and that a miscarriage of justice is not simply the result of insufficient
information.
The filmmaker Errol Morris, however, set out in The Thin Blue Line to
dispute the notion of his own documentary’s power. Rather than the more
typical mode of documentary filmmaking as presentation of a reality
objectively constructed through interviews and investigation, The Thin Blue
Line expressly subverts the notion of its own objectivity. It contains moments
of obviously suspended reality—clips from old gangster movies, exaggerated
reenactments signaling that they are merely the director’s version of reality,
and the repeated vision of a cup of coffee falling to the floor in slow motion,
literally suspended by the film medium.84
Most importantly, in The Thin Blue Line, Morris consciously and expressly
tells the audience that the film presents only one version of events and invites
them to witness their own attempts to construct a coherent narrative. The
film’s power lies in its message that we create our own truths, whether as a
movie audience or as a jury. Just as the jury became convinced that Adams
murdered a police officer, so the movie audience concludes that they convicted
the wrong man.
The Thin Blue Line thus illustrates the equally thin line between
filmmaking and civil litigation. It exposes the lie of documenting reality in a
way that applies to trials as well as documentary films. Understanding the film
as a postmodern meditation on legal storytelling offers insight into the verdicts
obtained through civil litigation.

83. See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 43 (describing The Thin Blue Line as “a cultural
symbol . . . that helped free a man from the corrupt grip of an ugly frameup”).
84. See id. at 61-63 (discussing the absence of captions to identify the people interviewed,
leaving the viewer with no direction of how to take the words in terms of the speaker’s social or
legal status; “the endlessly circling red police light”; and the “black and white clips of Hollywood
detective movies from the 1940s, a Tinseltown landscape of crimesolving offered to illustrate the
mental reality that [one of the trial witnesses] inhabited”).
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The Film Theory: Affirmative Postmodernism

Richard Sherwin uses The Thin Blue Line to show how “[i]n the context of
the law and legal judgments, the internalized frameworks that we draw upon to
organize and interpret events, experiences, and actions are necessary to the
most basic acts of separating out the believable from that which is false,
incredible, or simply unacceptable.”85 He explains that, like a trial, the movie
presents a linear, narrative story, in which “the audience as detective/juror
traces the clues that point to a sinister plot by state officials to frame Randall
Dale Adams.”86 In the narrative mode, “[t]he clues fit neatly into a story that
ends when the mystery of the frameup is revealed and solved.”87 The linear
story succeeds because “[w]e want to believe Adams is innocent; he fits our
image of a likely victim of official abuse. Similarly, it is easy for us to distrust
the people who participate in the frameup; they fit the script for the corrupt and
deceitful.”88
At the same time, Sherwin explains, the film engages in a “less familiar,
nonlinear (arguably postmodern) form of storytelling.”89 In this story, “we
find ourselves in a universe of fate and fortune, circularity and irresolution.
The nonlinear story about the murder of Officer Wood suggests that our
conventional knowledge about causation and meaning may not be sufficient.”90
The coexistence of this obviously nonlinear plot—with its message that we can
never know what is true—and the linear narrative “draws our attention not
only to how we recognize truth and justice, but also to those underlying shared
beliefs that allow us to agree upon a particular interpretation or meaning of an
event.”91 The Thin Blue Line gains its power, as Sherwin describes, by
“implicat[ing] all of us in our complacency about how easily we employ readymade notions of truth and justice to save ourselves from the anxiety and doubts
that might otherwise plague our judgments.”92
Sherwin spells out the message for the legal narrative of the trial by
reminding us that “the only reality that counts for a trial lawyer is the one in
the jury’s mind.”93 In a trial, lawyers provide jurors with “familiar mental
constructs” to help them create the linear narrative they crave, one “that best
reflect[s] a preferred sense of truth and justice.”94 In other words, although the
nonlinear, unknowable reality is truer to life, the trial is designed to create a
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Sherwin, supra note 4, at 59.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 63.
Sherwin, supra note 4, at 65.
Id. at 54.
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linear narrative that provides closure and absolutism. The only place for the
nonlinear lies in discrediting evidence that disturbs the clarity of the
constructed narrative.95
The lesson for a course in Civil Procedure is obvious. The prior
examinations of the importance of jurisdiction to select an audience, of
framing the legal narrative through the pleadings, and of drawing on the
“social imaginary” in the discovery process deposit one comfortably in the
realm of postmodern theory occupied by The Thin Blue Line. The civil verdict
is exposed as a neat narrative conclusion to a story that can not hope to convey
the reality of the events that gave rise to the lawsuit. Rather, it serves to
placate our desire for a clear “sense of truth and justice.”96
B.

Civil Procedure: Deconstructing the Jury’s Narrative

The Supreme Court’s decision in Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad97
serves as a classic example of how both the jury and the reviewing courts must
manipulate the trial evidence in order to arrive at a sufficiently linear legal
conclusion to satisfy the fiction that civil litigation leads to truth. The plaintiff
in Gallick was a crew foreman working on the railroad’s right of way.98 On
that stretch of road lay “a pool of stagnant water, in and about which were dead
and decayed rats and pigeons, or portions thereof.”99 While working near the
pool, Gallick was bitten by an insect; the bite subsequently became infected,
the infection spread throughout his body, and eventually both of his legs were
amputated.100 After a trial in state court, the jury returned a special verdict,
and the trial court awarded damages to Gallick.101
The first lesson postmodern film theory offers in considering the Gallick
case is the foolhardiness of special jury verdicts, or, for that matter, general
verdicts with interrogatories.102 To the lawyers and judges involved, the jury’s
particular findings must comport with a general legal conclusion: if the
elements of the claim are proven by the plaintiff, he wins; if they are not, he
loses. However, this expectation ignores the “social imaginary” of the jury, in

95. See id. at 75 (describing how the film’s “use of gangster filmstrips and cops-and-robbers
clips attempts to create a . . . dramatic tension. . . . [that] communicate[s] the absurdity of the
prosecution’s case against Randall Adams”).
96. Id. at 54.
97. Gallick v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 (1963).
98. Id. at 109.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 110, 112.
102. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

40

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:21

which they unconsciously bring their own expectations and beliefs into the
story, constructing it as they see reality, not necessarily as the law demands.103
The majority opinion of the Court appears to affirm the jury’s power to fill
in the gaps between frames, to deduct what they believe happened out of the
range of the camera, or the evidence presented. The Railroad argued that the
jury’s special verdict failed to establish either causation or foreseeability.104
As to causation, the Court found it sufficient that Gallick had testified that he
was bitten a second or two after walking away from the pool and that he had
previously seen similar insects in the pool.105 In addition, “two medical
witnesses testified that stagnant, rat-infested pools breed and attract insects.”106
Finally, in their special verdict, the jury found that the pool “attracted bugs and
vermin.”107
Although the jury never specifically found that the pool attracted this
particular insect or that the insect that bit Gallick came from the pool, the
Court found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of causation.108
Implicit in this conclusion is the recognition that the decision-maker must fill
in some gaps in the evidence to achieve the linear narrative that guarantees a
clear legal conclusion. Similarly, a movie audience might see only a shot of a
couple climbing out of a cab in front of a restaurant, immediately followed by
a shot of them sitting at a table inside the restaurant, but they will
unconsciously intuit that the couple walked across the sidewalk and into the
restaurant, where they were shown to the table. Indeed, they probably do not
even notice the missing “evidence.”
As to the Railroad’s argument that the special verdict did not support the
conclusion that Gallick’s injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the Railroad’s negligence, the Court found it “clear that the jury concluded that
[the Railroad] should have realized the increased likelihood of an insect’s
biting [Gallick] while he was working in the vicinity of the pool.”109 Although
the jury reached two conclusions that seemed inconsistent with a finding that
the Railroad was liable—that the Railroad “could not foresee that the stagnant
pool would set into being a chain of events that would culminate in petitioner’s
present physical condition” and that the Railroad “did not have reason to
anticipate that its maintenance of the pool ‘would or might probably result in a

103. See TIGAR, supra note 3, at 5 (“[Decision-makers] take the available evidence and weave
it into a coherent whole. If pieces are missing, they will fill in the gaps based on intuition,
probability, or prejudgment . . . .”).
104. See Gallick, 372 U.S. at 117.
105. See id. at 113.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 111.
109. Gallick, 372 U.S. at 119.
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mishap or an injury’”110—the Court iterated “the duty of the courts to attempt
to harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of them.”111
Again, the Court made clear the necessity of reconstructing the jury’s
construction of the story in a way that would satisfy the particular linear
dictates of the law. Under Sherwin’s theory of The Thin Blue Line, the film’s
nonlinear techniques succeed where they support the linear, narrative storyline
that the audience craves.112 The audience, constructing a story that makes
sense to them, can account for things that make no sense by according them the
role of that which they choose not to believe, much like a discredited witness.
While the jury acts like an audience, the reviewing courts must adhere strictly
to a storyline that is not just linear, but that is linear in a peculiarly legal way.
Just as the underlying events had to be framed within the constraints of the law
in the pleadings,113 so too the verdict must not stray from the logic of adding
up the elements to equal the wrong. The Gallick majority therefore
“harmonized” the jury’s otherwise understandable conclusions so that the
general linear narrative the jury constructed became a specifically legal one.
The Gallick dissent recognized that the majority was, in fact, filling in the
gaps to support an unequivocal legal conclusion to Gallick’s story. “By
undertaking to reconcile irretrievably conflicting findings of the jury,” the
dissent complained, “the Court, we think, has . . . invaded the province of the
jury.”114 The jury’s findings, according to the dissent, simply could not be
combined into a coherent legal narrative free of ambiguity. On the other hand,
the dissent subscribed to the belief that an unambiguous conclusion could be
reached by a different jury.115
Considering the jury verdict through the lens of postmodern film theory
suggests that the more the law strives for unambiguous legal conclusions, the
more it must “harmonize” the inconsistencies that exist in any representation of
events. Just as a film audience tends not to tolerate plot inconsistencies, so the
legal system abhors evidentiary ones, even when they reflect life’s
ambiguities.116
CONCLUSION
The audience never discovers whether justice is served at the end of
Shadow of the Vampire. They receive no information about a legal
investigation or trial. The film is not about social justice, but about the thin

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Sherwin, supra note 4, at 75.
See supra Part III.
Gallick, 372 U.S. at 127 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. (suggesting vacating the judgment and remanding for a new trial).
See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 71.
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lens of the camera that purports to separate reality from fiction and about the
ultimate invisibility of that glass borderline. The linear narrative of the film
concludes with the grisly actions of Willem Dafoe’s “vampire”; it is complete
and coherent without the aftermath of investigation and prosecution.
Civil Procedure picks up where the events of the film leave off. Just as the
filmmaker constructs a narrative “reality” that invites the audience to feel as if
they are living through the events in real time, our system of civil litigation sets
up a medium to view the events ex post facto, literally sitting in judgment. If
anything, applying film theory to Civil Procedure shows that the possibilities
for manipulating the audience’s perception of the story are even greater in civil
litigation than in filmmaking.
Given both the dangers of manipulation, misperception, and domination
and the inherent expectation that lawyers exploit the audience in the name of
zealous advocacy, the lessons of film theory have a particular urgency. As
with any innocent entertainment, film theory can be used merely to make Civil
Procedure interesting. But all innocent entertainments have a dark side, an
invocation of the unexamined biases we all carry with us and of our role in the
replication of systems of power and powerlessness. By employing film theory
to illuminate the dark side of our civil litigation system, Civil Procedure
professors can truly empower their students to work within a system that they
understand deeply, rather than being thoughtlessly directed by rules they fail to
question.

